Solution
Privasys Drive
End-to-end encrypted file storage where the operator holds no key, and you can prove it. Your files are sealed inside an attested confidential enclave, unlockable only by you. Connect Privasys Chat and the same sealed store becomes your assistant’s memory. Approve an app on your wallet and it becomes that app’s disk: a folder of its own, under your quota, with your Revoke.
Your files, sealed to hardware you can verify.
The operator holds no key
Every file is encrypted with its own key, wrapped under a master key that is generated inside the enclave and split across a vault constellation. In sovereign mode only the attested Drive enclave, acting for you, can reconstruct it. There is no operator key and no operator unlock path.
Sovereign or escrowed, and checkable
Individuals get sovereign mode by default. Organisations can opt into an escrowed mode with quorum-approved, audited, tenant-disclosed recovery. The mode is part of the measured configuration, so you attest an instance and read back which promise governs your keys.
A brain you own
Connect Privasys Chat and your Drive becomes the assistant’s memory. Conversations, notes, and knowledge are all sealed files. The assistant reaches them only as an attested tool, over a mutually attested channel, and only within a scope you set.
Memory that is complete, and cited
Your memory is served as an enumerable tree, so the assistant sees everything it knows before it answers, never a lucky sample. Documents are chunked along a stable structure, so every passage it uses resolves to a real span in a real file and can be cited.
Personal or per project
Scope a brain to your whole Drive for a personal assistant that knows your history, or to a single folder for an agent that sees exactly one project and nothing of your private life. Share the folder and the brain is shared, still sealed to the enclave.
Sharing without giving up identity
Share a file with a link, and Privasys never learns who opened it. Opening a shared file proves a wallet identity and nothing more, no name and no email, unless a private link explicitly asks for an attribute.
The disk of every confidential app, on your terms.
Apps ask, you approve, on your wallet
An app that needs storage asks for a folder by name. Your wallet fetches the request from the attested app itself, shows you exactly what is asked, and only your approval hands the app a grant bound to its own key. Refuse once and the app stops asking.
A folder of its own, never yours
Every approved app writes under AppData in your personal Drive, in a folder bound to that app and no other. It is an ordinary folder: browse it, share it, delete it. Deleting it is how you wipe an app’s data, and the app has to ask again.
A filesystem, not a bucket
Apps and agents get what a disk gives them: paths, revisions with conditional writes so two enclaves never clobber each other, appends that cost what is appended, byte ranges, a change feed, and grep and glob that run inside the enclave over decrypted streams.
Working trees as one item
A repository or a build is thousands of small files. An app keeps them on its own volume and saves snapshots to your Drive as one item: a manifest beside content-addressed blobs, browsable read-only, exportable as a ZIP, deletable in one gesture.
One gauge, one list, one Revoke
Everything an app stores counts against your quota, and the gauge breaks it down by folder and by app. The apps with access are listed with their folder, permissions and expiry. Revoke keeps your files and closes the app’s door.
Attested on both ends
A grant is worthless without the key it is bound to, and an app calling over an attested channel must also be the app the grant names. The runtime brokers consent for apps that declare their needs, so an app never holds the protocol, only the folder.
Read the details.
The encryption, the key hierarchy, the difference between sovereign and escrowed mode, and how apps obtain and use a folder are covered in depth in the documentation and in three companion essays: one on the storage layer, one on turning the Drive into a self-sovereign memory for agents, and one on the Drive as the disk of confidential apps.